O impacto de um presidencialismo "não convencional" e do governo minoritário em política externa: comparação da relação executivo e legislativo entre o governo Bolsonaro e governos da Nova República (1988-2022)

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2024
Autor(a) principal: Thomazini, Marlon Baltieri
Orientador(a): Braga, Maria do Socorro Sousa lattes
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de São Carlos
Câmpus São Carlos
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política - PPGPol
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/20.500.14289/20248
Resumo: This dissertation examines the relationships between the Executive and Legislative branches by analyzing propositions involving international themes. As a starting point, the following questions are posed: do parliamentarians cooperate less with minority governments than with majority governments in foreign policy? Do changes in the pattern of relations between parliamentarians and the Presidency affect cooperation between the two branches on international issues? Considering these questions, the dissertation compares the governments of the New Republic (1988-2022), with a greater emphasis on the Bolsonaro administration. There are two reasons for this focus. Bolsonaro government is characterized as a minority government, and during its term, changes in the pattern of relations between the Executive and Legislative branches were observed. In this context, we test two hypotheses: (i) parliamentary control is greater in minority governments than in majority governments; (ii) legislative control differs between coalition presidentialism governments and Bolsonaro government. The first hypothesis considers that parliamentary control is greater in minority governments than in majority governments because the Executive, without a majority legislative base, does not control the strategic positions necessary to approve its agenda. The second hypothesis considers that the Bolsonaro government does not use the traditional tools of the Executive to garner parliamentary support— in line with the history of coalition presidentialism — and when it approaches the Legislative, it does so through other “non-conventional” means. To verify these hypotheses, the differences in the legislative processing time of international treaties are analyzed in the Chamber of Deputies, based on the type of government and the type of relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches. It is concluded that parliamentarians continue to cooperate with the Executive as long as the Executive is able to meet their demands and preferences.