Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2014 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Vargas, Aline Vieira
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| Orientador(a): |
Costa, Jorge Campos da
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| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
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| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
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| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras
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| Departamento: |
Faculdade de Letras
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| País: |
BR
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| Palavras-chave em Português: |
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| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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| Link de acesso: |
http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2156
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Resumo: |
This work is a contribution to the contemporary debate between Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1885; Carston, 2002) and the Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature (Levinson, 2000). The main difference between the two theories regards to how they describe some implicatures considered salient or predictable. These implicatures are called explicatures in Relevance Theory, and default implicatures in Levinson‟s theory. While the latter argues that default implicatures are automatically generated, being triggered by specific types of utterances or expressions, Relevance Theory argues that both implicatures and explicatures are generated by the same mechanism, which is always inferential and dependent on intention recognition. Thus, the difference between implicatures and explicatures in Relevance Theory is justified by another property, namely, the fact of the latter to be considered as an explicit content capable of affect the truth-conditions of utterances. Therefore, the concepts of default implicature and explicature are not equivalent and arise from the two different bias of these theories, given their descriptive and explanatory goals. This fact makes comparisons between the two concepts difficult, especially because Relevance Theory has a commitment to the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the generation of implicatures and explicatures, being an interdisciplinary theory, while Levinson proposes a more focused discussion inside Linguistics, without the commitment to underlying cognitive mechanisms. Considering these differences, in recent years it has become common to perform experiments that supposedly test the predictions of these two theories, ignoring the fact that Levinson does not make clear predictions about how the default implicatures are processed. In view of these issues, the objectives of this work are the following : a) to show the problems of Levinson‟s model when it is taken from a cognitive point of view, especially with respect to the cognitive expenditure generated by the cancellation of default implicatures in many cases where they are inconsistent with the context, b ) to argue that default implicatures do not form a natural class, being composed of several distinct phenomena, and c) to show that Relevance Theory, although presenting clear and plausible predictions about the processing of implicatures and explicatures, has no valid criterion able to differentiate these two types of inference. Our conclusion is that the concepts on which this discussion is based are entities without identity. Thus, by applying the scientific principle of Occam's Razor, we argue that these levels do not have, at least so far, justification to be considered a separate level of implicatures |
