Resposta institucional ao risco de fuga de carbono no regime de comércio de licenças de emissão da União Europeia : uma análise fundamentada na teoria dos custos de transação

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Schlee, Bernhard Friedrich
• Orientador(a): Souza, Osmar Tomaz de
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Desenvolvimento
• Departamento: Escola de Negócios
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Economia Ambiental; Políticas Ambientais; Sistemas de Comércio de Emissões; Nova Economia Institucional; Teoria dos Custos de Transação
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Environmental Economics; Environmental Policies; Emissions Trading Systems; New Institutional Economics; Transaction Cost Theory
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA
• Link de acesso: http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/9434

The European Union Emission Trading System, the first and the largest emissions trading system in the world, is a centerpiece in the European Union’s strategy to contain pollutant emissions within its territory. However, there is a phenomenon that can compromise the efficiency of this market: carbon leakage. Such an occurrence arises when a stricter environmental regulation in a region causes emissions in other areas to increase, which can harm the general objective of the global reduction of anthropogenic emissions. The European system has created a mechanism to curb the risk of carbon leakage. This devise is primarily based on the offering of free emission allowances for sectors and subsectors of the economy that are exposed to carbon leakage. This dissertation investigates the inefficiencies contained in the rules created to prevent carbon leakage in the European Union Emission Trading System, which cause too many sectors and subsectors to benefit. It is also evidenced how the theory of transaction costs, with emphasis on the assumptions linked to the concepts of limited rationality and opportunism, helps to understand the causes of these institutional design flaws.