O espinho do ouriço : verdade e valor em Ronald Dworkin

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2017
Autor(a) principal: Jung, Luã Nogueira lattes
Orientador(a): Castro, Fabio Caprio Leite de lattes
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
Departamento: Escola de Humanidades
País: Brasil
Palavras-chave em Português:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/7442
Resumo: This thesis aims to analyze central aspects of Ronald Dworkin's practical philosophy, such as his theory of interpretation, the arguments through which the author defends the objectivity of values and his theory of truth. In this sense, Dworkin's critique of metaethics, from which he develops, especially in Justice for hedgehogs, his moral epistemology and his critique of Archimedean thought in general will be reviewed. Afterwards, the theory of the author's interpretation will be exposed. At this point, the theoretical references from which we can situate his thought will be indicated, as far as possible. According to what will be exposed throughout the text, it is from an interpretive and holistic perspective that we can best understand his work. Finally, some comments on his theory of truth will be presented in an attempt to identify Dworkin's precise conception of this theme and how it relates to the philosophical tradition.