Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2020 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Diniz, José Rodolpho Schultz
 |
| Orientador(a): |
Micheletto, Nilza |
| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Psicologia Experimental: Análise do Comportamento
|
| Departamento: |
Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e da Saúde
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| País: |
Brasil
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
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| Palavras-chave em Inglês: |
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| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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| Link de acesso: |
https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/23172
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Resumo: |
Radical behaviorism is considered a coherent philosophy in its positions, mainly on the aspects of its object of study and methodology. However, among behavior analysts, there are divergences related to epistemology and ontology of radical behaviorism, especially considering interpretations about the notion of truth and the assumption of the existence and independence of reality in relation to the subject who knows. This study aimed to describe and analyze which positions the authors have been presenting regarding these themes, through a review of published articles in journals. The search was performed with descriptors in the PsycNET and Brazilian Virtual Health Library (BVS, in Portuguese) databases. The search initially obtained 128 articles, and 40 were selected for analysis. The results pointed to a diversity and divergence of interpretations in the epistemological field with more frequent associations with the pragmatic truth; and, in the ontological field, a greater positioning of the authors in favor of the existence of reality and dependence on the reality of the subject who knows. However, contrary positions were identified among the authors regarding truth and reality, with incompatibilities regarding the positions of these authors and the epistemological and ontological theses, such as, for example, a large contingent of authors assuming reality, but conceiving a notion of truth that does not take this reality into account |
