O tempo e a prescrição no direito tributário

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Cascudo, Leonardo Soares Matos
• Orientador(a): Carvalho, Paulo de Barros
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Direito
• Departamento: Faculdade de Direito
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Prazos (Direito); Norma jurídica; Prescrição (Direito tributário)
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Time (Law); Legal standard; Limitation of actions (Taxation)
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO
• Link de acesso: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/21353

Time, not only in law, but also in any and all areas of knowledge, is a linguistic tool for measurement. The importance of the study of time lies on delimiting the beginning and the end of something planned in the empirical world. For Law, time demarcates the norms' dies a quo and ad quem, establishing the beginning of its validity, as well as the term. Therefore, the prescription's norm is viewed by much of the doctrine as the "end" of the right of action, insofar as it precludes the state judge's action in the case. But, unlike what is proposed by the doctrine, the limitation rule is not the loss of the right of action, inasmuch, in the semantic plane, it is the state judge's impossibility to satisfy the request by the inertia holder's right over a period of time. However, if we analyze in the syntactic plane, it is a rule that obliges the judge to extinguish the demand, due to the inertia time lapse provided in the antecedent of the primary prescription rule. To assert that it is a question of right action loss, is also to say that the prescription rule would act in the secondary rule, preventing its constitution, nevertheless, the premise does not proceed as long as, with the filing of the demand, the secondary rule is constituted, destroying the thesis which says the prescription is a norm of right of action extinction. It is, therefore, to affirm that the prescription rule would act in the obligatory modal, directed to the state judge's action, after the constitution of the secondary norm and of the right of action exercise, so that a third norm extinguishing the action is constituted. In these terms, the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic plan of the prescription definition would be consonant