O Brasil e o Regime Internacional de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares: adesão resistida na inserção brasileira

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2013
Autor(a) principal: Souza, Leandro Bessa
Orientador(a): Mello, Flavia de Campos
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Relações Internacionais: Programa San Tiago Dantas
Departamento: Relações Internacionais
País: BR
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/17428
Resumo: The objective of the present work is to analyzeBrazil´s insertion processinto the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime since the end of the military regime in the country in 1985, with the purpose of identify the presence ofpossiblecontinuity lines in the Brazilian Foreign Policy on this issue until the end of Lula´s second mandate. We search to study the hypothesis that, in spite of the changes of political parties and presidentson the country´s command, Brazil adopted a strategy of progressive critical and active participation in the discussions of the future of the regime in differentinternational forums.Its policy followedtwo basic master lines: the defenseof the global nuclear disarmament and the country´s right to develop nuclear technology for pacific ends. We founded our study in the analysis of the formation and contradictions of said regime, as well on the advances and reverses of Brazil´s nuclear activities. We conclude that during the examined time lapse, the country´s foreignpolicy had as permanency element what we called resisted adhesion , consistent with conducting the regime´s evolution to guarantee autonomy spaces for Brazil´s action in the nuclear area, avoiding assume bigger obligations for the country, in particular the ones related to nonproliferation, even if in times only by symbolic actions. This directive was maintained during Lula´s government and was intensified during his second mandate, which coincides with the country´s apparent interest in strengthening its nuclear projects on its different aspects. Despite of it, we don´t find possible to affirm that there is a consonance between the Brazilian investments on the nuclear area (which oscillate during the studied period) and its position on the regime in exam.