A Alocação de talentos no setor público brasileiro

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Café, Renata Motta
• Orientador(a): Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Concurso público; Má alocação; Mercado de trabalho; Public tender
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Misallocation; Labor market
• Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/21984

This paper investigates how the method of hiring used by the public sector can lead to allocative inefficiency and loss in total production, even under a neutral hypothesis that agents produce equally in the public and private sectors. We were motivated to examine this problem by Brazilian data from RAIS, where a simple exercise indicates significant overqualification of workers from the public sector in relation to the private sector, for all federative units. We developed a Roy model including two types of work at each sector, and considered individuals heterogeneous in two types of skill. While private sector hire freely and pay individuals proportionately to what they produce, the public sector announces a fixed remuneration ex-ante and organizes a selection based on only one type of skill, irrespective of the type of work. Results show that public tender, in particular when work is unrelated to the skill evaluated in the test, causes significant misallocation of selected candidates, causing decrease in the overall production of the economy.