Estrutura de propriedade, governança corporativa e tomada de risco pelos bancos

• Ano de defesa: 2022
• Autor(a) principal: Bellato, Leticia Lancia Noronha
• Orientador(a): Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo, Schiozer, Rafael Felipe
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Governança corporativa; Estrutura de propriedade; Risco; Bancos; Crise
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Risk; Ownership structure; Corporate governance; Crisis; Banks
• Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/32085

This study investigates whether excess control rights of controlling shareholders affect bank risk-taking. We exploit the 2015-2016 Brazilian crisis as an exogenous shock to banks' investment opportunities and future economic perspectives, and consequently to the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors (Lemmon & Lins, 2003). We use a unique database of Brazilian banks which makes it possible to consider, as far as we know, for the first time in the Banking literature, excess control rights stemming both from dual-class shares and pyramidal structures. We also analyze whether different control enhancing mechanisms (dual-class shares and pyramids) have the same impact on bank risk-taking. The results suggest a negative relationship between excess control rights and bank risk-taking and that banks reduce risk during crisis periods and that this reduction is even higher for banks with excess control rights. The results also suggest that the effect of the control enhancing mechanisms on banks' risk-taking depends on the mechanism used: while dual-class shares have a negative association with bank risk-taking, pyramidal structures present a positive relationship with bank risk-taking. Furthermore, these effects became more pronounced in times of crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature of corporate governance in banks and have critical policy implications for bank regulation.