Restrições verticais no setor automotivo: barreiras à entrada de novos concessionários

• Ano de defesa: 2005
• Autor(a) principal: Goldbaum, Sergio
• Orientador(a): Garcia, Fernando
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Economia de empresas; Defesa da concorrência; Restrições verticais; Barreiras à entrada; Setor automotivo - Brasil
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/4631

The objectives of this work are (i) to review the economic literature on vertical restraints, stressing efficiency effects as well as anticompetitive effects; (ii) to present institutional aspects of the adoption of vertical restraints in the automobile distribution in the United States and in Brazil, assessing the recent evolution of the relation between automobile makers and dealers in Brazil, and (iii) to investigate, using data on both the placing of automobile dealers and on automobile demand and supply factors in Brazil, the effects of the entry of new automobile dealers in previous monopoly markets. Concerning the last objective, we have adapted a binary choice model from Bresnahan e Reiss (1990) and concluded that the fixed costs of entry of a second automobile dealer seem to be, on the average, lower than the fixed costs of entry of the first one; and that the duopoly profits seem to be significantly lower than the monopoly profits, suggesting, in opposition of what was observed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) in the US market, strong competition among automobile dealers. Finally, possible implications of those conclusions are discussed.