Executive pay, firm performance and shareholder return: the case of Brazilian public firms

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Hofmeister, Pedro
• Orientador(a): Saito, Richard
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Palavras-chave em Português: Remuneração executiva; Retorno do acionista; Teoria do agente; Risco moral
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Executive pay-performance; Shareholder return; Principal-agent theory; Moral hazard
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/20691

This study focuses on the relation between the pay and performance of executives of Brazilian publicly listed firms. We used a series of multiple linear regressions with OLS estimation to investigate whether compensation is positively associated with shareholder return. Our sample includes 525 observations and comprises a three-year period (2014, 2015 and 2016). We find that, in general, pay is positively associated with performance but that this sensitivity is not sufficiently large. We also confirm that stock-based compensation and a higher governance level are important for aligning pay and performance. Firms with concentrated ownership tend to pay less, which suggests that monitoring decreases the need of pay to align incentives or reduces the power of executives to set their own compensation. Finally, our model suggests that fixed compensation is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent whereas variable compensation serves to address moral hazard.