Earnings at Risk para as instituições não-financeiras e as exigências da lei americana Sarbanes-Oxley

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2005
Autor(a) principal: Ferreira, Igor Rocha
Orientador(a): La Rocque, Eduarda Cunha de
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/333
Resumo: The demand for the corporative responsibility never was so great. The necessity to tie completely the corporative governance with the efficient activities of control never was so clear. This dissertation has the objective to answer the question whether Top Down1 approach of the Earnings at Risk2, might be considered compliant with the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements as a preventive control, and additionally, as an efficient method of risk management for non financial companies. Based on the results we have reached, the Top Down approach of EaR does not address the demands imposed by SarbanesOxley. Although SOX focus in the effectiveness instead of the efficiency of the controls used by the companies, management decision, based on this method may drive the company to big mistakes.