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Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Andrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa
Publication Date: 2022
Format: Master thesis
Language: eng
Source: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Download full: https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-24102024-154157/
Summary: In the Brazilian bankruptcy process, debtor and creditors bargain to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the insolvent firm. In January 2021, a Bankruptcy reform came into effect changing the rules of this bargain. Among other points, the reform: forces the liquidation of firms with pending fiscal debts, even those with a reorganization plan already approved by the firm\'s creditors; and ii) prioritizes financing given to firms after they entered judicial reorganization, known in the U.S. literature as DIP financing. We estimate a dynamic bargaining model with asymmetric information and simulate what would happen to a sample of firms in judicial reorganization in Sao Paulo state if the reform was already in effect. Our results indicate that if tax debts are as large as 5% of the total debt, the total recovery rate for in-court reorganization drops 3.3 percentage points. Financing for firms subject to judicial recovery speeds up the resolution of court cases in 1.69 months, while its effects on the total recovery rate for in-court reorganizations range from a 1.96 increase to a 1.92 decrease in the scenarios considered.
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spelling Bankruptcy design and frictions in BrazilDesenho de falências e fricções no BrasilBankruptcy frictionsBankruptcy lawEstimação estruturalFricções de falênciasJogos não cooperativosLei de falênciasNoncooperative gamesStructural estimationIn the Brazilian bankruptcy process, debtor and creditors bargain to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the insolvent firm. In January 2021, a Bankruptcy reform came into effect changing the rules of this bargain. Among other points, the reform: forces the liquidation of firms with pending fiscal debts, even those with a reorganization plan already approved by the firm\'s creditors; and ii) prioritizes financing given to firms after they entered judicial reorganization, known in the U.S. literature as DIP financing. We estimate a dynamic bargaining model with asymmetric information and simulate what would happen to a sample of firms in judicial reorganization in Sao Paulo state if the reform was already in effect. Our results indicate that if tax debts are as large as 5% of the total debt, the total recovery rate for in-court reorganization drops 3.3 percentage points. Financing for firms subject to judicial recovery speeds up the resolution of court cases in 1.69 months, while its effects on the total recovery rate for in-court reorganizations range from a 1.96 increase to a 1.92 decrease in the scenarios considered.No processo de recuperação judicial brasileiro, o devedor e os credores barganham para decidir se irão liquidar ou reorganizar a firma insolvente. Em janeiro de 2021, uma reforma na Lei de Recuperação Judicial e Falências entrou em vigor, alterando as regras desta barganha. Entre outros pontos, a reforma: i) força a decretação de falência de empresas sujeitas à recuperação judicial com débitos tributários pendentes, mesmo aquelas com plano de recuperação já aprovado pelos credores; e ii) prioriza o financiamento concedido para firmas após elas entrarem em recuperação judicial, conhecido na literatura norte-americana como DIP financing. Nós estimamos um modelo dinâmico de barganha com informação assimétrica e simulamos o que aconteceria com uma amostra de firmas em recuperação judicial no estado de São Paulo se a reforma já estivesse em vigor. Nossos resultados indicam que, se as dívidas tributárias forem de 5% do total de dívidas, a taxa de recuperação total para reorganizações dentro da corte cai 3.3 pontos percentuais. O financiamento para firmas em recuperação judicial acelera a resolução de casos dentro da corte em 1.69 mês, enquanto seus efeitos na taxa de recuperação total para reorganizações dentro da corte variam desde um aumento de 1.96 ponto percentual a uma diminuição de 1.92 ponto percentual nos cenários considerados.Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USPFerreira, Rafael de Vasconcelos XavierAndrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa2022-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttps://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-24102024-154157/reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USPinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPLiberar o conteúdo para acesso público.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesseng2024-11-22T19:20:02Zoai:teses.usp.br:tde-24102024-154157Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://www.teses.usp.br/PUBhttp://www.teses.usp.br/cgi-bin/mtd2br.plvirginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.bropendoar:27212024-11-22T19:20:02Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
Desenho de falências e fricções no Brasil
title Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
spellingShingle Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
Andrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa
Bankruptcy frictions
Bankruptcy law
Estimação estrutural
Fricções de falências
Jogos não cooperativos
Lei de falências
Noncooperative games
Structural estimation
title_short Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
title_full Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
title_fullStr Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
title_full_unstemmed Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
title_sort Bankruptcy design and frictions in Brazil
author Andrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa
author_facet Andrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Ferreira, Rafael de Vasconcelos Xavier
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Andrade, José Matheus Gomes Pessôa
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Bankruptcy frictions
Bankruptcy law
Estimação estrutural
Fricções de falências
Jogos não cooperativos
Lei de falências
Noncooperative games
Structural estimation
topic Bankruptcy frictions
Bankruptcy law
Estimação estrutural
Fricções de falências
Jogos não cooperativos
Lei de falências
Noncooperative games
Structural estimation
description In the Brazilian bankruptcy process, debtor and creditors bargain to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the insolvent firm. In January 2021, a Bankruptcy reform came into effect changing the rules of this bargain. Among other points, the reform: forces the liquidation of firms with pending fiscal debts, even those with a reorganization plan already approved by the firm\'s creditors; and ii) prioritizes financing given to firms after they entered judicial reorganization, known in the U.S. literature as DIP financing. We estimate a dynamic bargaining model with asymmetric information and simulate what would happen to a sample of firms in judicial reorganization in Sao Paulo state if the reform was already in effect. Our results indicate that if tax debts are as large as 5% of the total debt, the total recovery rate for in-court reorganization drops 3.3 percentage points. Financing for firms subject to judicial recovery speeds up the resolution of court cases in 1.69 months, while its effects on the total recovery rate for in-court reorganizations range from a 1.96 increase to a 1.92 decrease in the scenarios considered.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-03-31
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-24102024-154157/
url https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-24102024-154157/
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público.
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv
reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
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institution USP
reponame_str Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
collection Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv virginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.br
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