Export Ready — 

THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Pimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique
Publication Date: 2023
Format: Article
Language: por
Source: Pólemos (Brasília)
Download full: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/48069
Summary: For Schopenhauer, reason determines a fundamental difference between man and the animal. The ability to abstract the particular into a general concept is something that only man can do. The philosopher was not the first to demonstrate this truth; but his considerations about the constitution of the human cognizing apparatus and how it can know what is its object break, in fact, with the current thinking of some of his contemporaries, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In the course of this study, we will investigate (1) the atypicality of Schopenhauer's idealism in relation to the models of knowledge developed until then; (2) what is the constitution of our cognitive apparatus that allows us to know the empirical world; (3) under which modalities objects become representations for the subject; (4) finally, what allows man to abstract and, thus, give rise to the general concepts that name the world.
id UNB-36_3f4440aa44dae04b47261640f4a2f7d0
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/48069
network_acronym_str UNB-36
network_name_str Pólemos (Brasília)
repository_id_str
spelling THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER A PASSAGEM DAS REPRESENTAÇÕES INTUITIVAS ÀS REPRESENTAÇÕES ABSTRATAS EM SCHOPENHAUEREntendimento. Representação. Razão. Conceito.Understanding. Representation. Reason. Concept.For Schopenhauer, reason determines a fundamental difference between man and the animal. The ability to abstract the particular into a general concept is something that only man can do. The philosopher was not the first to demonstrate this truth; but his considerations about the constitution of the human cognizing apparatus and how it can know what is its object break, in fact, with the current thinking of some of his contemporaries, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In the course of this study, we will investigate (1) the atypicality of Schopenhauer's idealism in relation to the models of knowledge developed until then; (2) what is the constitution of our cognitive apparatus that allows us to know the empirical world; (3) under which modalities objects become representations for the subject; (4) finally, what allows man to abstract and, thus, give rise to the general concepts that name the world.Para Schopenhauer, a razão determina uma diferença fundamental entre o homem e o animal. A capacidade de abstração do particular em um conceito geral é algo que apenas cabe ao homem. O filósofo não foi o primeiro a evidenciar esta verdade; mas suas considerações sobre a constituição do aparato cognoscente humano e como este pode conhecer aquilo que lhe é objeto rompem, de fato, com o pensamento corrente de alguns de seus contemporâneos, como Fichte, Schelling e Hegel. No decorrer deste estudo, investigaremos (1) como se dá a singularidade do idealismo de Schopenhauer em relação aos modelos de conhecimento até então desenvolvidos; (2) qual a constituição de nosso aparato cognitivo que nos permite o conhecimento do mundo empírico; (3) sob quais modalidades os objetos se tornam representações para o sujeito; (4) por fim, o que permite ao homem a abstração e, assim, dar origem aos conceitos gerais que nomeiam o mundo.Priscila Rossinetti Rufinoni2023-12-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTexto info:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/4806910.26512/pl.v12i25.48069PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília; v. 12 n. 25 (2023); 191 - 2142238-76922238-769210.26512/pl.v12i25reponame:Pólemos (Brasília)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBporhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/48069/39300Copyright (c) 2023 PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasíliainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique2024-02-25T02:25:26Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/48069Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/PUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/oaiperiodicos.bce@unb.br | polemosunb@gmail.com2238-76922238-7692opendoar:2024-02-25T02:25:26Pólemos (Brasília) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
A PASSAGEM DAS REPRESENTAÇÕES INTUITIVAS ÀS REPRESENTAÇÕES ABSTRATAS EM SCHOPENHAUER
title THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
spellingShingle THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
Pimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique
Entendimento. Representação. Razão. Conceito.
Understanding. Representation. Reason. Concept.
title_short THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
title_full THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
title_fullStr THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
title_full_unstemmed THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
title_sort THE PASSAGE FROM INTUITIVE TO ABSTRACT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCHOPENHAUER
author Pimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique
author_facet Pimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pimentel Beluzio, Igor Henrique
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Entendimento. Representação. Razão. Conceito.
Understanding. Representation. Reason. Concept.
topic Entendimento. Representação. Razão. Conceito.
Understanding. Representation. Reason. Concept.
description For Schopenhauer, reason determines a fundamental difference between man and the animal. The ability to abstract the particular into a general concept is something that only man can do. The philosopher was not the first to demonstrate this truth; but his considerations about the constitution of the human cognizing apparatus and how it can know what is its object break, in fact, with the current thinking of some of his contemporaries, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In the course of this study, we will investigate (1) the atypicality of Schopenhauer's idealism in relation to the models of knowledge developed until then; (2) what is the constitution of our cognitive apparatus that allows us to know the empirical world; (3) under which modalities objects become representations for the subject; (4) finally, what allows man to abstract and, thus, give rise to the general concepts that name the world.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-12-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/48069
10.26512/pl.v12i25.48069
url https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/48069
identifier_str_mv 10.26512/pl.v12i25.48069
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/polemos/article/view/48069/39300
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Priscila Rossinetti Rufinoni
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Priscila Rossinetti Rufinoni
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília; v. 12 n. 25 (2023); 191 - 214
2238-7692
2238-7692
10.26512/pl.v12i25
reponame:Pólemos (Brasília)
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Pólemos (Brasília)
collection Pólemos (Brasília)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Pólemos (Brasília) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv periodicos.bce@unb.br | polemosunb@gmail.com
_version_ 1839277263184461824