A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM

• Autor(a) principal: Tormin, Mateus Matos
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
• Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.186
• topic: Original Articles

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.