A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Marques, Nuno Castro
Publication Date: 2017
Format: Article
Language: eng
Source: Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
Download full: https://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2017.352
Summary: Regardless of the extreme negative qualifications usually attributed to cartels and bid rigging, EU and Portuguese competition laws do not set them apart from other anticompetitive practices regarding the possible applicable sanctions. EU and Portuguese competition laws establish the same potential sanctions for all competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements, but those differences have essentially to do with rules or procedures designed to facilitate their detection, production of evidence and decision-making. Notwithstanding the relevance of the “traditional” arguments regarding cartel criminalization, we consider that the discussion is still incomplete and would benefit from the inclusion of an additional “filter”. As it is a discussion about a criminalization process, the use of common instruments in criminology can shed more light into the question, and one of those instruments – or the most important one – is the analysis of the legal interests protected by the norm. We deem it essential to think about what legal interests are harmed in each of the different types of competition infringements, so as to conclude if indeed and to what extent cartels and bid rigging are capable of impairing more or different legal interests, or in a different intensity, than those potentially violated by other types of competition infringements. The conclusion is that cartel and bid rigging conducts always infringe the entire set of legal interests that is or may be defended by competition laws and always do so with high intensity.
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spelling A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?Regardless of the extreme negative qualifications usually attributed to cartels and bid rigging, EU and Portuguese competition laws do not set them apart from other anticompetitive practices regarding the possible applicable sanctions. EU and Portuguese competition laws establish the same potential sanctions for all competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements, but those differences have essentially to do with rules or procedures designed to facilitate their detection, production of evidence and decision-making. Notwithstanding the relevance of the “traditional” arguments regarding cartel criminalization, we consider that the discussion is still incomplete and would benefit from the inclusion of an additional “filter”. As it is a discussion about a criminalization process, the use of common instruments in criminology can shed more light into the question, and one of those instruments – or the most important one – is the analysis of the legal interests protected by the norm. We deem it essential to think about what legal interests are harmed in each of the different types of competition infringements, so as to conclude if indeed and to what extent cartels and bid rigging are capable of impairing more or different legal interests, or in a different intensity, than those potentially violated by other types of competition infringements. The conclusion is that cartel and bid rigging conducts always infringe the entire set of legal interests that is or may be defended by competition laws and always do so with high intensity.Universidade Católica Editora2017-10-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2017.352https://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2017.352Market and Competition Law Review; Vol 1 No 2 (2017); 141-176Market and Competition Law Review; v. 1 n. 2 (2017); 141-1762184-000810.7559/mclawreview.2017.1.2reponame:Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)instname:FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiainstacron:RCAAPenghttps://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/mclawreview/article/view/352https://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/mclawreview/article/view/352/320Copyright (c) 2017 Nuno Castro Marquesopen accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarques, Nuno Castro2024-07-03T11:00:54Zoai:ojs.revistas.ucp.pt:article/352Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireinfo@rcaap.ptopendoar:https://opendoar.ac.uk/repository/71602025-05-28T10:23:48.955529Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) - FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
title A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
spellingShingle A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
Marques, Nuno Castro
title_short A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
title_full A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
title_fullStr A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
title_full_unstemmed A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
title_sort A Different Path to the Same Old Question: Why Should Cartels be Criminalised?
author Marques, Nuno Castro
author_facet Marques, Nuno Castro
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Marques, Nuno Castro
description Regardless of the extreme negative qualifications usually attributed to cartels and bid rigging, EU and Portuguese competition laws do not set them apart from other anticompetitive practices regarding the possible applicable sanctions. EU and Portuguese competition laws establish the same potential sanctions for all competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements. Despite that, there are clear indications that EU and Portuguese legislators intend to treat cartels differently from all other competition infringements, but those differences have essentially to do with rules or procedures designed to facilitate their detection, production of evidence and decision-making. Notwithstanding the relevance of the “traditional” arguments regarding cartel criminalization, we consider that the discussion is still incomplete and would benefit from the inclusion of an additional “filter”. As it is a discussion about a criminalization process, the use of common instruments in criminology can shed more light into the question, and one of those instruments – or the most important one – is the analysis of the legal interests protected by the norm. We deem it essential to think about what legal interests are harmed in each of the different types of competition infringements, so as to conclude if indeed and to what extent cartels and bid rigging are capable of impairing more or different legal interests, or in a different intensity, than those potentially violated by other types of competition infringements. The conclusion is that cartel and bid rigging conducts always infringe the entire set of legal interests that is or may be defended by competition laws and always do so with high intensity.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-10-01
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url https://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2017.352
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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https://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/mclawreview/article/view/352/320
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Nuno Castro Marques
open access
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rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Nuno Castro Marques
open access
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica Editora
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica Editora
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Market and Competition Law Review; Vol 1 No 2 (2017); 141-176
Market and Competition Law Review; v. 1 n. 2 (2017); 141-176
2184-0008
10.7559/mclawreview.2017.1.2
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