Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
Main Author: | |
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Publication Date: | 2018 |
Other Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | eng |
Source: | Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) |
Download full: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682 |
Summary: | We analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important. |
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Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching modelFlexicurityunemployment insuranceSocial SciencesWe analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important.We thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions. O. R. Straume acknowledges the financial support provided by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Operational Program Factors of Competitiveness (COMPETE); and by national funds received through the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) under the research grant PEst-C/EGE/UI3182/2013.WileyUniversidade do MinhoLommerud, Kjell ErikStraume, Odd RuneVagstad, Steinar2018-07-012018-07-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682engLommerud, K. E., Straume, O. R., & Vagstad, S. (2018, July). Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Wiley. http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.122440347-052010.1111/sjoe.12244info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)instname:FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiainstacron:RCAAP2024-05-11T06:03:14Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/65682Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireinfo@rcaap.ptopendoar:https://opendoar.ac.uk/repository/71602025-05-28T15:39:25.347098Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) - FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiafalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
title |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
spellingShingle |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model Lommerud, Kjell Erik Flexicurity unemployment insurance Social Sciences |
title_short |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
title_full |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
title_fullStr |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
title_full_unstemmed |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
title_sort |
Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model |
author |
Lommerud, Kjell Erik |
author_facet |
Lommerud, Kjell Erik Straume, Odd Rune Vagstad, Steinar |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Straume, Odd Rune Vagstad, Steinar |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lommerud, Kjell Erik Straume, Odd Rune Vagstad, Steinar |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Flexicurity unemployment insurance Social Sciences |
topic |
Flexicurity unemployment insurance Social Sciences |
description |
We analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-07-01 2018-07-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Lommerud, K. E., Straume, O. R., & Vagstad, S. (2018, July). Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Wiley. http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12244 0347-0520 10.1111/sjoe.12244 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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