An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rodrigues, Helena Sofia
Publication Date: 2009
Other Authors: Monteiro, M. Teresa T., Vaz, A. Ismael F.
Format: Article
Language: eng
Source: Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
Download full: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/10848
Summary: An electric power market is formulated as a Stackelberg game where two firms, A and B, produce energy. Two distinct situations, according to the firm who plays the leader role, are analysed. In the first one, the firmA is the leader and the firm B is the follower, and in the second situation the players reverse their roles. In order to select the optimal strategy, the leader uses as knowledge his own perception of the market and anticipates the reactions of the other followers. The main goal of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the various agents that compose the electric power network, such as transmissions capacity, quantities of power generated and demanded, when the leadership changes. The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) and reformulated into a nonlinear program (NLP), allowing the use of robust NLP solvers. Computational results using Lancelot, Loqo and Snopt solvers are performed. The numerical experiments show that the firm profit is conditioned by the available information.
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spelling An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadershipElectric powerStackelberg gameLeadershipMPCCNLP solverScience & TechnologyAn electric power market is formulated as a Stackelberg game where two firms, A and B, produce energy. Two distinct situations, according to the firm who plays the leader role, are analysed. In the first one, the firmA is the leader and the firm B is the follower, and in the second situation the players reverse their roles. In order to select the optimal strategy, the leader uses as knowledge his own perception of the market and anticipates the reactions of the other followers. The main goal of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the various agents that compose the electric power network, such as transmissions capacity, quantities of power generated and demanded, when the leadership changes. The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) and reformulated into a nonlinear program (NLP), allowing the use of robust NLP solvers. Computational results using Lancelot, Loqo and Snopt solvers are performed. The numerical experiments show that the firm profit is conditioned by the available information.Taylor and FrancisUniversidade do MinhoRodrigues, Helena SofiaMonteiro, M. Teresa T.Vaz, A. Ismael F.20092009-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/10848eng"International Journal of Computer Mathematics." ISSN 0020-7160. 86:10-11(2009) 1921-1931.0020-71601029-026510.1080/00207160902906471info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)instname:FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiainstacron:RCAAP2024-05-11T07:17:59Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/10848Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireinfo@rcaap.ptopendoar:https://opendoar.ac.uk/repository/71602025-05-28T16:22:13.893417Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) - FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
title An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
spellingShingle An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
Rodrigues, Helena Sofia
Electric power
Stackelberg game
Leadership
MPCC
NLP solver
Science & Technology
title_short An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
title_full An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
title_fullStr An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
title_full_unstemmed An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
title_sort An MPCC approach on a Stackelberg game in an electric power market: changing the leadership
author Rodrigues, Helena Sofia
author_facet Rodrigues, Helena Sofia
Monteiro, M. Teresa T.
Vaz, A. Ismael F.
author_role author
author2 Monteiro, M. Teresa T.
Vaz, A. Ismael F.
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rodrigues, Helena Sofia
Monteiro, M. Teresa T.
Vaz, A. Ismael F.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Electric power
Stackelberg game
Leadership
MPCC
NLP solver
Science & Technology
topic Electric power
Stackelberg game
Leadership
MPCC
NLP solver
Science & Technology
description An electric power market is formulated as a Stackelberg game where two firms, A and B, produce energy. Two distinct situations, according to the firm who plays the leader role, are analysed. In the first one, the firmA is the leader and the firm B is the follower, and in the second situation the players reverse their roles. In order to select the optimal strategy, the leader uses as knowledge his own perception of the market and anticipates the reactions of the other followers. The main goal of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the various agents that compose the electric power network, such as transmissions capacity, quantities of power generated and demanded, when the leadership changes. The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) and reformulated into a nonlinear program (NLP), allowing the use of robust NLP solvers. Computational results using Lancelot, Loqo and Snopt solvers are performed. The numerical experiments show that the firm profit is conditioned by the available information.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009
2009-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/10848
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/10848
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv "International Journal of Computer Mathematics." ISSN 0020-7160. 86:10-11(2009) 1921-1931.
0020-7160
1029-0265
10.1080/00207160902906471
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
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