R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Rabah, Amir
Data de Publicação: 2011
Outros Autores: Garcia, Filomena, Ermes, Christine H., Pais, Joana
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25850
Resumo: Duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect works to the advantage of consumers and society. This result provides an interesting perspective on the well-known wedge between private and social incentives for R&D. The prisoner’s dilemma is the key effect behind this wedge under low spillovers. The latter take over when sufficiently high, as is widely recognized. This mutually exclusive nature of the prisoner’s dilemma and significant spillovers also serves to explain the incentives to form R&D cartels.
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spelling R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartelsDuopoly FirmsR&DCompetitionPrsioner’s DilemmaDuopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect works to the advantage of consumers and society. This result provides an interesting perspective on the well-known wedge between private and social incentives for R&D. The prisoner’s dilemma is the key effect behind this wedge under low spillovers. The latter take over when sufficiently high, as is widely recognized. This mutually exclusive nature of the prisoner’s dilemma and significant spillovers also serves to explain the incentives to form R&D cartels.John Wiley & SonsRepositório da Universidade de LisboaRabah, AmirGarcia, FilomenaErmes, Christine H.Pais, Joana2022-10-31T11:46:16Z20112011-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25850engAmir, Rabah … [et al.]. (2011). " R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels". The Manchester School , Vol. 79, .No 1: pp. 81-99.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)instname:FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiainstacron:RCAAP2025-03-17T16:27:40Zoai:repositorio.ulisboa.pt:10400.5/25850Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireinfo@rcaap.ptopendoar:https://opendoar.ac.uk/repository/71602025-05-29T04:15:37.269572Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) - FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologiafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
title R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
spellingShingle R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
Rabah, Amir
Duopoly Firms
R&D
Competition
Prsioner’s Dilemma
title_short R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
title_full R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
title_fullStr R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
title_full_unstemmed R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
title_sort R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels
author Rabah, Amir
author_facet Rabah, Amir
Garcia, Filomena
Ermes, Christine H.
Pais, Joana
author_role author
author2 Garcia, Filomena
Ermes, Christine H.
Pais, Joana
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rabah, Amir
Garcia, Filomena
Ermes, Christine H.
Pais, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Duopoly Firms
R&D
Competition
Prsioner’s Dilemma
topic Duopoly Firms
R&D
Competition
Prsioner’s Dilemma
description Duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect works to the advantage of consumers and society. This result provides an interesting perspective on the well-known wedge between private and social incentives for R&D. The prisoner’s dilemma is the key effect behind this wedge under low spillovers. The latter take over when sufficiently high, as is widely recognized. This mutually exclusive nature of the prisoner’s dilemma and significant spillovers also serves to explain the incentives to form R&D cartels.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2011-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-10-31T11:46:16Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25850
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25850
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Amir, Rabah … [et al.]. (2011). " R&D as a prisoner’s dilemma and R&D - avoiding cartels". The Manchester School , Vol. 79, .No 1: pp. 81-99.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
instname:FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
collection Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) - FCCN, serviços digitais da FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
repository.mail.fl_str_mv info@rcaap.pt
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