The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Taddei, Paulo Mendes
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/36570
Resumo: The objections made by Daniel Dahlstrom (2001) and by Rufus Duits (2007) against Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth are reconstructed in this paper. Both purport to defend Heidegger against Tugendhat’s charges by showing that the most primordial concept of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) does account for falsehood. Roughly while Dahlstrom maintains that Tugendhat does not does justice to the transcendental character of Heidegger’s primordial truth, Duits contends that Tugendhat is still attached to the metaphysical perspective of Vorhandenheit. The aim of this paper is to show that both contenders miss the decisive point in Tugendhat’s critique, which lies, as part of the literature has shown (LAFONT, 1994; SMITH, 2007), not so much in the demand for an explanation of falsehood, but rather in the demand for a justification for the semantic transition of ‘truth’. After showing in the first two sections how respectively Dahlstrom and Duits miss the core of Tugendhat’s criticism, I defend in the third section my interpretation of Tugendhat’s critique against certain reservations recently articulated by Wrathall (2011). I conclude by both pointing out the alignment between my proposal and Heidegger’s own concession in Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens and indicating some pending issues.
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spelling The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’La cuestión fundamental en la crítica de Tugendhat a Heidegger: falsidad, apertura y la transición semántica de la ‘verdad’A questão fundamental da crítica de Tugendhat a Heidegger: falsidade, descerramento e a transição semântica de ‘verdade’Truth. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsehood.Verdad. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsedad.Verdade. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsidade.The objections made by Daniel Dahlstrom (2001) and by Rufus Duits (2007) against Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth are reconstructed in this paper. Both purport to defend Heidegger against Tugendhat’s charges by showing that the most primordial concept of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) does account for falsehood. Roughly while Dahlstrom maintains that Tugendhat does not does justice to the transcendental character of Heidegger’s primordial truth, Duits contends that Tugendhat is still attached to the metaphysical perspective of Vorhandenheit. The aim of this paper is to show that both contenders miss the decisive point in Tugendhat’s critique, which lies, as part of the literature has shown (LAFONT, 1994; SMITH, 2007), not so much in the demand for an explanation of falsehood, but rather in the demand for a justification for the semantic transition of ‘truth’. After showing in the first two sections how respectively Dahlstrom and Duits miss the core of Tugendhat’s criticism, I defend in the third section my interpretation of Tugendhat’s critique against certain reservations recently articulated by Wrathall (2011). I conclude by both pointing out the alignment between my proposal and Heidegger’s own concession in Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens and indicating some pending issues.En este artículo se recogen las objeciones de Daniel Dahlstrom (2001) y Rufus Duits (2007) a la crítica de Tugendhat (1970) a la tesis heideggeriana de que el concepto primordial de verdad consiste en la noción de no-velamiento (Unverborgenheit). De diferentes maneras, ambos autores sostienen que Heidegger, a diferencia de las acusaciones de Tugendhat, sería capaz de dar cuenta de la falsedad. En líneas generales, mientras Dahlstrom propone que Tugendhat no apreció el carácter trascendental del concepto originario de verdad en Heidegger, Duits acusa a Tugendhat de haberse aferrado a la perspectiva metafísica de Vorhandenheit. El objetivo de este artículo es indicar, con la ayuda de esa discusión, la cuestión fundamental de la crítica de Tugendhat que, como parte de la literatura mostró (LAFONT, 1994; SMITH, 2007), reside no tanto en la exigencia de una explicación para la falsedad, pero mucho más en el requisito de una justificación para la transición semántica de ‘verdad’. Después de mostrar en las dos primeras secciones como, respectivamente, Dahlstrom y Duits no llegan al corazón de la crítica de Tugendhat, defiendo en la tercera sección mi interpretación de la crítica de Tugendhat contra ciertas reservas recientemente articuladas por Wrathall (2011). Concluyo señalando la coherencia de esta interpretación con la concesión de Heidegger en Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens y señalando algunas cuestiones pendientes.Reconstroem-se, neste artigo, as objeções de Daniel Dahlstrom (2001) e Rufus Duits (2007) à crítica de Tugendhat (1970) à tese heideggeriana de que o conceito primordial de verdade consiste na noção de desvelamento (Unverborgenheit). De diferentes modos, ambos os autores mantêm que Heidegger, ao contrário das acusações de Tugendhat, seria capaz de dar conta da falsidade. Grosso modo, enquanto Dahlstrom propõe que Tugendhat não apreciou o caráter transcendental do conceito originário de verdade em Heidegger, Duits acusa Tugendhat de haver se prendido à perspectiva metafísica da Vorhandenheit. O objetivo deste artigo é indicar, com a ajuda dessa discussão, a questão fundamental da crítica de Tugendhat que, como parte da literatura mostrou (LAFONT, 1994; SMITH, 2007), reside não tanto na exigência de uma explicação para a falsidade, mas muito mais na exigência de uma justificação para a transição semântica de ‘verdade’. Após mostrar nas duas primeiras seções como, respectivamente, Dahlstrom e Duits não atingem o cerne da crítica de Tugendhat, defendo na terceira seção minha interpretação da crítica de Tugendhat contra certas reservas recentemente articuladas por Wrathall (2011). Concluo indicando a consonância dessa interpretação com a concessão de Heidegger em Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens e apontando algumas questões pendentes.Editora da PUCRS - ediPUCRS2020-05-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/3657010.15448/1984-6746.2020.1.36570Veritas (Porto Alegre); Vol. 65 No. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e36570Veritas (Porto Alegre); Vol. 65 Núm. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e36570Veritas (Porto Alegre); v. 65 n. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e365701984-67460042-395510.15448/1984-6746.2020.1reponame:Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)instacron:PUC_RSporhttps://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/36570/19686Copyright (c) 2020 Veritas (Porto Alegre)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTaddei, Paulo Mendes2022-11-17T12:58:36Zoai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/36570Revistahttps://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/indexPRIhttps://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/oaiveritas@pucrs.br | luis.rosenfield@pucrs.brhttps://doi.org/10.15448/1984-67461984-67460042-3955opendoar:2022-11-17T12:58:36Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
La cuestión fundamental en la crítica de Tugendhat a Heidegger: falsidad, apertura y la transición semántica de la ‘verdad’
A questão fundamental da crítica de Tugendhat a Heidegger: falsidade, descerramento e a transição semântica de ‘verdade’
title The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
spellingShingle The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
Taddei, Paulo Mendes
Truth. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsehood.
Verdad. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsedad.
Verdade. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsidade.
title_short The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
title_full The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
title_fullStr The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
title_full_unstemmed The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
title_sort The Fundamental Issue in Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger: Falsehood, Disclosure, and the Semantic Transition of ‘Truth’
author Taddei, Paulo Mendes
author_facet Taddei, Paulo Mendes
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Taddei, Paulo Mendes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Truth. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsehood.
Verdad. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsedad.
Verdade. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsidade.
topic Truth. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsehood.
Verdad. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsedad.
Verdade. Heidegger. Tugendhat. Falsidade.
description The objections made by Daniel Dahlstrom (2001) and by Rufus Duits (2007) against Tugendhat’s criticism of Heidegger’s concept of truth are reconstructed in this paper. Both purport to defend Heidegger against Tugendhat’s charges by showing that the most primordial concept of truth as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) does account for falsehood. Roughly while Dahlstrom maintains that Tugendhat does not does justice to the transcendental character of Heidegger’s primordial truth, Duits contends that Tugendhat is still attached to the metaphysical perspective of Vorhandenheit. The aim of this paper is to show that both contenders miss the decisive point in Tugendhat’s critique, which lies, as part of the literature has shown (LAFONT, 1994; SMITH, 2007), not so much in the demand for an explanation of falsehood, but rather in the demand for a justification for the semantic transition of ‘truth’. After showing in the first two sections how respectively Dahlstrom and Duits miss the core of Tugendhat’s criticism, I defend in the third section my interpretation of Tugendhat’s critique against certain reservations recently articulated by Wrathall (2011). I conclude by both pointing out the alignment between my proposal and Heidegger’s own concession in Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens and indicating some pending issues.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-15
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/36570
10.15448/1984-6746.2020.1.36570
url https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/36570
identifier_str_mv 10.15448/1984-6746.2020.1.36570
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/36570/19686
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Veritas (Porto Alegre)
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Veritas (Porto Alegre)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora da PUCRS - ediPUCRS
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora da PUCRS - ediPUCRS
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Veritas (Porto Alegre); Vol. 65 No. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e36570
Veritas (Porto Alegre); Vol. 65 Núm. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e36570
Veritas (Porto Alegre); v. 65 n. 1 (2020): Moral & Political Philosophy; e36570
1984-6746
0042-3955
10.15448/1984-6746.2020.1
reponame:Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)
instacron:PUC_RS
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)
instacron_str PUC_RS
institution PUC_RS
reponame_str Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)
collection Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv veritas@pucrs.br | luis.rosenfield@pucrs.br
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