Methods to improve certificate linkage and revocation procedures in vehiculat networks.

• Ano de defesa: 2019
• Autor(a) principal: Ferraz, Leonardo Tórtora Devienne
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Instituição de defesa: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
• Palavras-chave em Português: Autonomous vehicles; Birthday attacks; Emissão de certificados digitais; Issuing digital certificates; Network security; Privacidade revogável.; Revocable privacy; Segurança de redes; Veículos autônomos
• Link de acesso: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/3/3141/tde-15042019-133307/

Vehicular communication technologies, also called Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, are expected to become common in the future, providing better effciency and safety in transportation. This envisioned large-scale deployment, however, critically depends on addressing some requirements. For example, to prevent abuse by drivers, messages exchanged among authorized vehicles must be authenticated, which implies the need of a Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI). Unlike traditional Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), though, VPKIs are also expected to preserve the drivers\' privacy; in particular, neither eavesdroppers or system entities should be able to easily identify or track the movements of vehicles using non-revoked certificates. One promising VPKI solution, which copes with such requirements and is among the main candidates for standardization in the United States and Europe, is Security Credential Management System (SCMS). In this thesis, aiming to address shortcomings identified in the SCMS architecture, three main contributions are provided. First, a mechanism for improving the exibility of revocation is described, allowing certificates and their owner\'s privacy to be temporarily revoked in an eficient manner; this functionality is useful, for example, in case a software malfunction is detected and a patch still needs to be released. Second, two birthday attacks against SCMS\'s certificate revocation process are detailed and then fixed, thus preventing the system\'s security degradation with the number of issued and revoked certificates. Finally, a method is proposed which simplifies SCMS\'s system architecture, removing the need for the so-called Linkage Authorities (LAs); this not only reduces the cost for SCMS\'s deployment, but also improves its security and privacy due to the removal of one potential point of failure/collusion.