Practical reason and its role in determining the ends of action in Aristotle\'s practical philosophy

• Ano de defesa: 2024
• Autor(a) principal: Sousa, Victor Gonçalves de
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Instituição de defesa: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
• Palavras-chave em Português: Aristóteles; Aristotle; Ends of action; Ethics; Ética; Fins da ação; Practical reason; Razão prática
• Link de acesso: https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-19122024-125043/

The aim of this Dissertation is to ascertain what role reason has in determining the ends of action in Aristotle\'s practical philosophy. I argue that Aristotle is committed to an answer to this question according to which full virtue (ἀρϵτὴ κυρία) enables one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. Yet, on my reading, full virtue would not be necessary for aiming for fine ends (although being virtuous in some sense turns out to be necessary for that), which is sufficient for securing that agents who are not fully virtuous such as the continent and the incontinent are able to aim for ends that are right, provided they cannot aim for such ends for their own sakes