Essays on cartels stability under antitrust policies

• Ano de defesa: 2022
• Autor(a) principal: Huamani Quispe, Williams Ubaldo
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Viçosa; Economia Aplicada
• Palavras-chave em Português: Organização industrial (Teoria econômica); Cartéis; Direito antitruste; Organização Industrial e Estudos Industriais
• Link de acesso: https://locus.ufv.br//handle/123456789/30703; https://doi.org/10.47328/ufvbbt.2022.271

This thesis is composed of three essays about cartels’ stability under antitrust policies. The first essay aims to create a new approach to analyze optimal antitrust policies to combat cartels in a more general context. Using the repeated games theory we build a scenario where a cartel — any collusive strategy can be considered — operates under an economy with antitrust policies. We show that antitrust policies — antitrust enforcement without leniency program, ex-ante leniency program, and ex-post leniency program — negatively affect cartels’ stability. However, there are no optimal antitrust enforcement parameters without a leniency program to destabilize cartels. On the other hand, we find that total immunity of the whistle-blower cartel member is more effective than partial immunity in destabilizing cartels. The second essay aims to answer the question: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are horizontally more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Cournot’s (Bertrand ’s) horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we conclude that antitrust enforcement is more effective on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. However, it should be noted that antitrust enforcement negatively affects cartel stability — regardless of the degree of differentiation. The third essay aims to answer: is antitrust enforcement more effective against cartels when products are vertically more homogeneous or differentiated? Based on Bertrand’s vertically differentiated duopoly model, we show that antitrust enforcement uniformly and negatively affects cartel stability, for every product quality differentiation degree — antitrust enforcement does not strongly affect the stability of a cartel that has a specific product quality differentiation degree. Keywords: Market Structure. Collusion Economics. Antitrust Policies.