Infinitude e Rupturas no Logicismo de Gottlob Frege

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Cardoso, Luciano Carvalho [UNIFESP]
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP)
• Palavras-chave em Português: Arithmetic; Thought; Concepts; Enumerability; Aritmética; Pensamento; Conceitos; Enumerabilidade; Infinitude
• Link de acesso: https://sucupira.capes.gov.br/sucupira/public/consultas/coleta/trabalhoConclusao/viewTrabalhoConclusao.jsf?popup=true&id_trabalho=9740701; https://hdl.handle.net/11600/64634

The construction of Fregian Logicism, as an approach that redefines the laws that underlie thought and arithmetic, is recognized for being grounded in the denial of intuition and for structuring a first and second order logic in accordance with extensional logic so that The foundation of arithmetic truths is configured as analytical. In his later works, published only posthumously, Frege will define a distinct approach to Logicism. Now grounded in a source of geometric knowledge, which partly relies on the logical foundation of knowledge, the new Fregian model seems to recognize the importance of intuition in this process. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the path of construction of Fregian Logicism, the contradictions that would arise as Frege matured his system, the disruptions that Infinity caused and, after finding his system inconsistent, Frege restructures into a prototype model of unified mathematics.