Racionalidade das tradições e possibilidades de superação do relativismo moral em Alasdair Macintyre

• Ano de defesa: 2021
• Autor(a) principal: Beal, Diego
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; Brasil; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia; Racionalidade; Tradição; Relativismo; Moral; Philosophy; Rationality; Tradition; Relativism; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/23401

This thesis has as its theme the theory of rationality in the traditions of Alasdair MacIntyre and the possibilities of overcoming moral relativism. The research problem consists of investigating and proposing answers to the following question: how to avoid moral relativism in MacIntyre, when the resumption of an ethics of virtues combined with the defense of a plurality of traditions (often rivals) that are transformed in the course of of time? The general objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the possibilities of overcoming relativism in MacIntyre's moral philosophy, considering the assumptions of his theory of the rationality of traditions. The specific objectives are: to analyze the concept of constituted and constitutive rationality of tradition; investigate some of the critical formulations in relation to the limitations and implications of the definition of Macintyrean virtue; research on possible answers and blunt solutions to the problem of relativism; and constructing propositions on which the moral debate could be oriented, avoiding the relativistic threat. As for the methodological procedures, the dialectical method was used, with the adoption of a qualitative approach and use of a bibliographic reference, available in the form of books, e-books and scientific articles. The research addresses the conditioning aspects of rational investigation and the context of criticism of contemporary morals, presents the development of the concept of virtue in MacIntyre's moral philosophy, retracing the path of practices, narrative unit and tradition, recovering the MacIntyre's understanding of the rationality of traditions and the criteria that underlie rational research, exposes the reasons that would make relativism possible in Macintyrean moral theory and investigates its rejection possibilities. Finally, it is concluded by the refutation of the relativist theses, after the formulation of arguments that overcome the relativist, perspectivist and particularist challenges.