As bases empíricas da moral em Hume

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Portela, Bruno Martinez
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; BR; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: David Hume; Moral; Empirismo; Sentimento; Empiricism; Feeling; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9108

This dissertation aims to investigate the moral theory of David Hume from his empirical method. In order that it is necessary to analyze his critique of rationalism and metaphysics as a method to moral foundation, the presentation of the empirical method as a possible theoretical foundation of morality and expose his moral theory in the context of his philosophical system. It is intended, therefore, to show that in Hume the reason by itself is insufficient to justify the moral, whose realization is possible only within the sensitivity. Similarly, the objective is to demonstrate that, although Hume s philosophy is skeptical concerning the metaphysical precepts and usual rationalist traditions, his understanding about morality is positive and intends to be universal.