O problema dos universais no medievo: o nominalismo de Ockham e a passagem da ontologia à lógica

• Ano de defesa: 2015
• Autor(a) principal: Souza, Laiza Rodrigues de
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraíba; Brasil; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ockham; Universal; Universais; Suposição; Supposition; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/8323

This work intends to present an overview of the medieval Quarrel of Universal. The debate about the status of universals has its conceptual basis in the thought of the ancient philosophers and traditionally opens with the formulation of Porphyry. During the Middle Ages there were several hypotheses about what state of universal, among which we highlight the realism of Duns Scotus and Bonaventure, the extreme nominalism of Roscellinus and the anti-realism of Peter Abelard. Finally, we present the William of Ockham’s solution to the problem of universals. With a nominalist position, which is against the existence of any universal entity out of mind, Ockham develops an theory of supposition in which universals are taken as mentally that according to a semantic function, take the place of individuals referred to in a propositional context. Thus, we try to show how Ockham's perspective brings the problem of universal from the ontological scope for the logical.