Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraíba; Brasil; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Raciocínio moral; Dilemas morais; Emoções; Deliberação moral; Motivação moral; Moral reasoning; Moral dilemmas; Emotions; Moral deliberation; Moral motivation; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11864

The present work deals with emotions as determinant factors in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas. In fact, we can say that genuine moral dilemmas are situations of conflicts in which the same duty is required and denied because it is not possible to accomplish both, since to perform the action prescribed by one of the conflicting duties implies not to perform the other. This type of deliberation suggests an experience that cannot be satisfactorily explained within a theory of traditional moral reasoning (which holds that correct reasoning is deductive logical reasoning). However, there are other moral reasoning theories that present different points of view and take into account other elements as part of our deliberative process. For example, we have the Social Intuitionist Model of Haidt (2000), who argues that moral intuitions are the cause of our moral judgments and reasoning is a later step whose purpose is only to justify the judgments formed by intuition. We also have a theory advocated by Harman, Maison and Sinnot-Armstrong (2009), the Model of Reflective Equilibrium, which defends the idea that in our moral judgments we use both reasoning and intuitions. According to this model to arrive at a coherent moral judgment, we go through a process in which we test our intuitions against reasoning and test reasoning against our intuitions (Liao, 2010). Diverging a bit from the purely logicist strand of moral reasoning, we find the psychological theory of moral reasoning proposed by Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2008). We can say that it is a theory about moral propositions and it defends that there is no simple criterion for choosing the moral propositions among the immense range of deontic propositions. The mechanisms underlying moral emotions and judgments are independent and operate in parallel; Deontic judgments depend on inferences; And our beliefs about what is moral or not are neither complete nor consistent. From these different perspectives, through which we can understand moral reasoning, we aim to analyze to what extent these theories consider the question of moral dilemmas. Knowing that moral agents, in the face of a conflicting situation, must decide what to do, and since reason, as traditionally defined, cannot deal with contradictions, we defend the hypothesis that the emotions act as enabling elements of this kind of deliberation. This viability is manifested through the influence of emotions in the moral judgments concerning the dilemma, as well as the motivational factor that instigates the agent to act according to his deliberation. Thus, considering that our emotions are perceptions of values (Tapollet, 2000) we argue that they can be decisive in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas, from the formation of moral judgments, to the decision about what to do, as well as motivating forces that lead to action.