Uma Abordagem paraconsistente para o problema da consistência nos dilemas morais.

• Ano de defesa: 2013
• Autor(a) principal: Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia; Dilemas morais; Consistência lógica; Lógica deônica; Lógica deônica paraconsistente; Moral Dilemmas; Logic Consistency; Deontic Logic; Paraconsistent Deontic Logic; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5619

This work deals with the question of logical consistency inside the context of moral dilemmas or, more specifically, genuine moral dilemmas, which are situations where someone has a conflict between two obligatory actions guided by the same moral principle. In other words, it is a situation where there are two moral obligations which should be satisfied, but since they are incompatible, while sometimes one is the negation of the other, they cannot be both accomplished. When we formalize moral dilemmas along with some deontic principles, the result is a contradiction. Inside the framework of classical deontic logic, due to its limitation of dealing with paradoxes of such kind, the existence of moral dilemmas is taken as something absurd, as an affront to rationality. Thus, given the inconsistency, the solution would be to deny the existence of the dilemmas, which has been the most widespread solution, or to deny the deontic principles involved in the inconsistency. We do not agree with these two solutions. Instead, we propose to weaken the rationalist argumentation based on the existence of dialetheias and on the suggestion of dealing with moral dilemmas inside a paraconsistent framework, in such a way that the existence of inconsistence would not be a reason any more to deny the existence of such dilemmas.