Os problemas da opinião falsa e da predicação no diálogo sofista de Platão

• Ano de defesa: 2013
• Autor(a) principal: Cavalcante Filho, Francisco de Assis Vale
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ser; Não ser; Verdade; Falsidade; Lógos; Being; Not being; Truth; Falsehood; Logos; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5638

The thesis of the impossibility of falsehood becomes from the interpretation of negation as contrarierity. Being false what is not true, then falsehood is impossible. Plato diagnoses this problem as a derivative of sophistic reading of Parmenides' Poem. The Eleatic argument advocates the interdicto of the route that "is not" as a result of the unknowability of what is not. Plato receives in many ways throughout the corpus the problems about the sophistic readings and denounces in the heart of the Sophist the misconception that consists of taking the contrarierity as the sole meaning of the negative. It follows, for example, the theory of the infallibility of opinion found in the Theaetetus. For if it is impossible to give an opinion about "what is not" every judgment will be free from falsehood. The caveat made "Protagoras" is that the truth of doxa is for appearance and how something appears to whom it seems. The answer to theses expounded by Gorgias in the treatise On Nature or What is Not, in turn, is synthesized by Plato in the Sophist theses about: being, "what-is-not" as a genre of the other and the predicative nature of logos. This new understanding that affects the meaning of negative become feasible beyond the aporias, the relationship between beings who agree or disagree with each other, is reflected in the true or false statements. For the philosopher truth is not a property of things, but a predicate of speech.