Um estudo lógico e epistemológico do fecho epistêmico.

• Ano de defesa: 2013
• Autor(a) principal: Medeiros, Stanley Kreiter Bezerra
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Epistemologia; Incognoscibilidade; Ceticismo; Epistemic closure; Necessary unknowability; Contingent unknowability; Vskepticism; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5617

Epistemic closure is the principle that says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. If an agent, S, knows that some proposition P is the case and, beside of that, equally knows that P logically implies another proposition, say, Q, then S must also know that Q is the case. Thus, if S believes Q in a strong base provided by the premisses, then he must also know that Q is the case. The present work is a logical-epistemological study of epistemic closure principles, based on the notion of contingent unknowability. Noting that the problem of epistemic closure is open and that the common attempts in contemporary mainstream epistemology seem to ignore the results of the formal epistemology about the relationship between these principles and the property of logical omniscience, our main goal is to provide a strategy for an epistemological analysis of epistemic closure principles that consider these results, taking into account the purpose of applicability of a particular closure principle, according to the situation and the agents that one wants to model. An example of this strategy will be given when analyzing closure principles from the perspective of agents that reason about contingently unknowable propositions. Our hypothesis is that, in this particular application, certain closure principles do not hold.