Valor, custos de agência e efeito moderador do conselho de administração no mercado brasileiro

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Leite, Ulisses Medeiros Barbosa
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraíba; Brasil; Administração; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Governança corporativa; Valor de mercado; Custos de agência; Fronteira estocástica; Corporate governance; Market value; Agency costs; Stochastic frontier analysis; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/18350

This study had as purpose to evaluate the moderator effect of the board of management in the relationship between agency costs and company value. The study took place in the Brazilian Market for the period from 2010 to 2018, in which a final sample of 225 companies was used, making a total of 1602 firms-observations for the period in question. This study aimed to establish a measure of agency costs through the Stochastic Frontier Analysis, making itself part of a research branch that seeks to apply a direct approach in measuring agency costs. Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, the agency costs are estimated by comparing company’s Tobin Q with a hypothetical Q*, which would be obtained if the company operated at peak performance. The results indicated that (a) board independence has a positive impact on company’s agency costs and negative on company’s value, (b) board size has a positive and weak impact on company’s value, and (c) a positive moderator effect of company’s board size and independence on company’s value. Segregating the sample into three groups of agency cost (high, medium and low), the models were estimated for the two extreme groups of high and low agency costs. As observed in the literature reviewed, the results are stronger for the high agency costs group, in which can be highlighted the importance of the board independence as a moderator variable in the relationship between agency cost and company’s value and the emergence of board remuneration as having a negative impact on agency costs. In turn, for the low agency cost group the results of the board variables are statistically insignificant. From the results found, the board independence stands out as being the most important board variable to minimize the harmful effect of agency costs on the company's value. The results of this study provide indications that the corporate governance mechanisms work under different conditions, such as the fact that the company has a high or low level of agency costs. It is important for managers, as they reveal which mechanisms to invest in and which are more efficient to generate value and reduce agency costs. Also important for investors, as it allows for better monitoring of company management by knowing which mechanisms that have already been or are being adopted are more efficient, and for the market, which gains with transparency and credibility by being aware of which mechanisms are more efficient for certain organizations.