Dependência de objeto e a ilusão de compreender
Ano de defesa: | 2009 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
UFMG |
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Link de acesso: | http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ARBZ-7THFA8 |
Resumo: | Since language and thought dont always mirror each other, speakers may be deluded about the propositions they think they grasp when they try to understand certain utterances. However, as Russells theory of descriptions shows, the object independent semanticsof quantified phrases accounts for this possibility being ruled out when it comes to understanding definite descriptions. Thus, to understand a sentence containing a definite description, it is not necessary that the speaker knows which object it describes, if any. In sharp contrast, the semantics of referring expressions implies the object dependencyof singular thoughts, since objects referred to are part of the proposition expressed by utterances of sentences with referring expressions. There simply is no proposition or thought to be grasped in uttering these sentences if the referring expression does not refer to something. The illusion of understanding amounts to intending to understand these utterances. However, a specification of the necessary conditions to understand referring expressions is not able to explain the impossibility of understanding sentences that do not express propositions, since the specification itself is object dependent. In acknowledging the fallibilism inherent to linguistic understanding, as well as the limits of this theory of understanding, this thesis is skeptical about the very strategy of deriving necessary conditions for understanding and communication solely from truth conditions. Finally, I propose the adoption of less strict conditions for understanding so that it may give room to linguistic deference as a genuine mode of understanding. |