A ideia de obrigação na teoria moral e política de Thomas Hobbes

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Davidson Ricardo da Costa Moraes
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia; Ciência politica Filosofia; Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679; Ética
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-B6ZJ4H

One of the central aspects of Hobbes's political thinking is precisely to be able to base the idea of obligation. Once the state of nature is set up as a completely anarchic scenario, the question arises as to how to base an idea of obedience around the sovereign. Hobbes seeks to show that sovereign power is the only one capable of delivering men from the war of all against all, but that for this to be possible, he defends the idea that men are obliged to obey the sovereign by which they have agreed. In this sense, the debate about what in fact is capable of sustaining an obligation in his thought, that is, whether the obligation is the result of the covenant, according to which men accept the restriction of their freedom, or if the men would be obliged because the sovereign is one who is able to exercise coercive power through the sword. Both interpretations create difficulties for Hobbesian thought, for if on the one hand the pact can be seen as incapable of generating an obligation, on the other hand, coercive power may not be legitimately capable of generating an obligation. For this reason, our investigation attempted to discuss this impasse and to analyze what in fact creates obligation in Hobbes's thinking.