Interrupção voluntária da gravidez : por uma abordagem relacional

• Ano de defesa: 2021
• Autor(a) principal: Letícia Ferruzzi Sacchetin
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Brasil; FAFICH - FACULDADE DE FILOSOFIA E CIENCIAS HUMANAS; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Interrupção voluntária da gravidez; Pessoalidade; Ética do cuidado; Ética das virtudes; Objeção de consciência; Abordagem relacional
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/42759

This research took as its object the morality of voluntary interruption of pregnancy (IVG), with the objective to demonstrate the relevance of a relational approach to the discussion on the topic. This is because the philosophical level, largely, the discussion consists of establishing a position on the personality of the fetus: if it is a person, it would have a moral right to life, which would make abortion not allowable. The opposite would occur if the fetus is not a person, thus making abortion morally permissible. In addition to facing the difficulty of establishing a philosophically indisputable theory of personality, the biggest problem with this line of argument is that it does not allow the pregnant woman – protagonist of the theme – to appear in philosophical discussions. Thus, we argue that the best approach to the morality of termination of pregnancy is relational, that is, an approach that is able to encompass the fetus, pregnant women, the family members and society involved. We did this through a philosophical bibliographic and, to exemplify pregnancy scenarios, literary. During the research, some theories appeared to us as promising for presenting the relational perspective when developing their themes: certain theories of personality, the ethics of care and the ethics of virtues. The first chapter discusses some theories of personality, emphasizing the theory of Marya Schechtman (2014), because the author thinks about personality in its multiple dimensions, from the body to the insertion of person in the social and cultural infrastructure. The second chapter begins with Carol Gilligan's Ethics of Care (1980), which seeks to bring a different voice (female) to the construction of a new morality, which is based on caring for the other and caring for oneself. A more detailed reflection is developed on the process of pregnancy as a moment of choice, in which the pregnant woman appears as a center of multiple relationships, involving the fetus and its closest context, emphasizing that it is not a matter of abstractly solving if interrupting a pregnancy is right or wrong, but rather whether the decision process is responsible, careful, or the other way around. The proposal presented by Tânia Kuhnen (2015a), who develops Gilligan's theory through the universalizable principle of care, expands the possibilities of Gilligan's original theory. Continuing the theme, the Ethics of Virtues complements the Ethics of Care, by pointing out that morality implies individual flourishing through virtues and involves the gestational context. In the third chapter, we address issues related to the medical context more directly, mainly through the theme of conscientious objection, in order to cover public health issues. In summary, the purpose of the dissertation was to propose that the philosophical methodology is capable of covering different perspectives on the morality of the IVG. This is only possible, as we argued, through relational approaches.