Coordenação federativa e a armadilha da decisão conjunta: as comissões de articulação intergovernamental das políticas sociais no Brasil

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Pedro Lucas de Moura Palotti
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Coordenação federativa; Políticas sociais; Paralisia decisória; Armadilha da decisão conjunta; Ciência política; Política social; Brasil Política social
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-8XVNRU

Collegiate bodies, formed by representatives of municipal, state and federal authorities, were organized for discussion of governmental actions in some Brazilian public policies in the post-88. However, as pointed by the literature in political science, systems of jointdecision between different levels of government can provide risks of decisional paralysis or suboptimal results. This research aimed to investigate whether the intergovernmental commissions of social policies (health, welfare and education) are capable to produce rules to coordination among federal entities, although consensual policy-making spaces with direct representation of subnational units. In the light ofempirical evidence, the studied commissions deliberated a large number of relevant resolutions, with the exception of education, whose institutional design is quite restrictive. In the end, some hypotheses try to explain these results, ranging from the existence of common sectoral identities, through the power of agenda control and strategic resources by the Federal Executive to the dynamics of the agreement processitself and its institutional design.