Hölderlin em Iena: união e cisão nos limites do pensamento

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Wagner de Avila Quevedo
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia; Holderlin, Friedrich, 1770-1843; Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1762-1814; Idealismo alemão
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-B9AJUY

This study focuses on a philosophical issue worked out in the foundation of theoretical knowledge of Fichtes Science of Knowledge (1794-95), whose lectures Hölderlin attends in Jena from the second half of 1794 on. As Fichte develops it in his system, the way we perceivereality must be accompanied by the feeling of necessity and certainty of experiencing what is real, but we also perceive reality necessarily unconscious of its production by the power of imagination. In his argument, the transcendental philosopher must guarantee that this process paradoxically takes place outside the objective consciousness, otherwise reality would be illusory for the subjective experience, and hence the science of knowledge would be a mere dogmatic idealism. Since Fichte defines the activity of thought as a rational determining ofimagination, and given that this activity is linked with the effective explanation of subjectivity, my hypothesis is that the criticism Hölderlin offers to Fichte in Jena hits hard this nodal point o Science of Knowledge. And it also does the same with the whole methodological claim ofexplaining subjectivity within conscious experience by means of an absolute I as an unifying element, viz., the I that is reason. As Hölderlin sees it, this argument trespasses the conditions of consciousness, and accordingly the relation of consciousness with a unifying explanation ofsubjectivity remains exposed to a constitutive division we cannot account adequately for. The division is posited in the activity of thought itself, viz., as division, it defines the limits of this rational activity that determines imagination. On the one hand, there is a conception of a beingpure and simple untouchable by objective consciousness that is operative in the division; on the other, there is the demand of union with this being qua totality. Prompted by Fichtean Philosophy, Hölderlin restructures this issue by putting into the center of explanation of consciousness the Platonic idea of beauty, understood as a sign of sensible and rational union that would stitch the open wound of Kantian Philosophy. In some of his attempts of setting a union outlined in theversions of Hyperion (1795), Hölderlin conceives the unity in terms of a dynamic unity-totality, which restores the meaning of the Spinozism widespread by Lessing and Jacobi in the 1780s under the motto . When he writes the first volume of Hyperion (1796), Hölderlinstresses even more this conception by enrolling beauty into the historical dimension of unitytotality, therefore explained as a unity in itself differentiated. The study firstly pursuits the problem of an absolute I by Fichte, and then situates both Hölderlins criticism as its outcomes in the fragment Judgment and Being (1795). After exposing the thesis of division in thought, the work ends with an account of how this limits of thought or rather thought of limits are/is incorporated in some layers of the work on Hyperion until its final version of a differentiated unity. As a result, the union qua division within the limits of thoughtreveals itself as a difference within unity