Redes de proteção: incentivos, escolhas e comportamento na política brasileira.

• Ano de defesa: 2009
• Autor(a) principal: Sabino Jose Fortes Fleury
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: arenas; Redes de proteção; Incentivos; Equilíbrios; Partido político; Coalizão; Múltiplas; Teoria dos jogos; Estrutura administrativa federal; Partidos políticos; Governos de coalizão; Administração pública
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUBD-89JHGJ

The structure of the Brazilian federal government, very wide and decentralized, provides a large amount of resources which are usually perceived by the political actors as important factors for the conformation of their preferences and, consequently, their choices and decisions. These resources - budgetary, administrative and financial - acting asinstitucional constraints, allow the political actors to identify and to rank their preferences and, doing so, to produce the intelligibility that is absolutely necessary to equilibrate the political games. In this sense, the burocratic structure of the federal government and its offices functionin Brazil as a kind of general equivalent, that can be use in the political bargains. So, the process of appropriation of these resources by the policital actors contributes: a) to minimize zero sum situations in the political arena, by elevating the amout of rewards; b) to decrease the transaction costs that, on ad hoc political negotiation, tend to be very elevated; c) to build networks which protect or minimize, for individual actors, the damages caused for failures in the electoral arena.