Comercialização da carne suína em São Paulo: análise de transmissão de preços

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Castro, Aline Carvalho de
• Orientador(a): Silva Neto, Waldemiro Alcântara da
• Banca de defesa: Silva Neto, Waldemiro Alcântara da, Monsueto, Sandro Eduardo, Miqueleto, Guilherme Jacob
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Goiás
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-graduação em Economia (FACE)
• Departamento: Faculdade de Administração, Ciências Contábeis e Ciências Econômicas - FACE (RG)
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Comercialização agropecuária; Carne suína; Assimetria na transmissão de preços
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Agricultural marketing; Pork; Asymmetric price transmission
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: TEORIA ECONOMICA::ECONOMIA GERAL
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/6882

The aim of this work is to study São Paulo pork marketing at levels of producer, wholesale and retail. In order to reach the objective was studied marketing margin, price transmission analysis and asymmetric price transmission test. The marketing margins study showed that retail is the market level that holds most of the sector's margins, averaging 56% over the analyzed period, while the wholesale margin and the producer share are on average 8% and 36% respectively. Regarding the analysis of price transmission, the SVEC model indicated that 1% producer’s prices variation, turn to 0,74% wholesale price’s variation, while 1% wholesale’s prices variation repercussion the retail price in 0,5%. Therefore, prices changes are not completely transmitted to the next stage. Production’s stage is most susceptible to adjustment along the chain, while retail is the most influencer to other stages prices. Result of the asymmetric error correction model (ECM) shows that price transmission farmer to retail is asymmetric. Indicating that increases and decreases in producer prices are not transmitted in the same path by retailers. Such evidence can be explained by high marketing margins at retailer stage, participation in large retail chains that have market power, access to information by being in direct contact with consumers and a high degree organization. Even not producing and not having the product, they are agents whose negotiate through contracts, which incur in less risk.