Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2014 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Oliveira, Hermogenes Hebert Pereira
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| Orientador(a): |
Sanz, Wagner de Campos
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| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
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| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Goiás
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| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)
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| Departamento: |
Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG)
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| País: |
Brasil
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| Palavras-chave em Português: |
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| Palavras-chave em Inglês: |
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| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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| Link de acesso: |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/3103
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Resumo: |
Proof-theoretic Semantics provides a new approach to the semantics of logical constants. It has compelling philosophical motivations which are rooted deeply in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics. We investigate this new approach of logical semantics and its perspective on logical validity in the light of its own philosophical aspirations, especially as represented by the work of Dummett (1991). Among our findings, we single out the validity of Peirce’s rule with respect to a justification procedure based on the introduction rules for the propositional logical constants. This is an undesirable outcome since Peirce’s rule is not considered to be constructively acceptable. On the other hand, we also establish the invalidity of the same inference rule with respect to a justification procedure based on the elimination rules for the propositional logical constants. We comment on the implications of this scenario to Dummett’s philosophical programme and to proof-theoretic semantics in general. |
