A relação do monitoramento e transparência com a quantidade de covenants nos contratos de debênture

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2017
Autor(a) principal: Neves, Fabrício Conceição das
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo
BR
Mestrado em Ciências Contábeis
Centro de Ciências Jurídicas e Econômicas
UFES
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
657
Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/8870
Resumo: This study aims to test the relation between monitoring and transparency mechanisms with the number of restrictive covenants that, if violated, lead to technical default of the bond. The theory shows that higher monitoring levels and higher transparency levels leads bond issued with less covenants. This happens because monitoring and transparency prevents the risk that covenants try to protect the bondholder from. In order to reach the objective, 227 contracts of 133 companies, issued from 2011 to 2015 were analyzed. The monitoring and transparency test was constructed based on governance index made by Bortolon and Da Silva Junior (2015) and IBGC (2014). As control variables, the study used variables related to contracts (series, issue, incentive, exemption, guarantee and deadline) and related to the companies (size, control, profitability, debt level, ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights and risk). To measure the relation between the monitoring and transparency mechanisms with the number of bond covenants, mean difference test and binomial negative regression were used. The results show that companies with more transparency mechanisms generally have a lower number of covenants, while the relation of monitoring with the number of covenants diverges from prior expectation. The effect of Cross monitoring, in which the monitoring is done by other stakeholders, in total number of covenants may be the reason for the results being different than expected.