A multidimensionalidade da competição no mercado de produtos e o gerenciamento de resultados

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2019
Autor(a) principal: Rampazzo, Rodrigo de Souza
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo
BR
Mestrado em Ciências Contábeis
Centro de Ciências Jurídicas e Econômicas
UFES
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/13726
Resumo: The present dissertation aims to investigate the effect of the multidimensionality of the product-market competition on the earnings management through the manipulation of accruals and real activities in the Brazilian companies listed in B3. The existing literature provides a dichotomous prediction about the association of the product market competition and the earnings management. On the one hand, the product market competition could generate incentives for managers to manipulate accounting information (HERMALIN; WEISBACH; HAAS, 2007; ROTEMBERG; SCHARFSTEIN, 1990). On the other hand, the product-market competition discipline managers to act in the best interests of shareholders (BAGGS; DE BETTIGNIES, 2006; HART, 1983; HOLMSTROM, 1982; SCHMIDT, 1997). In order to test the relationship between product market competition and earnings management, we used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with two-dimensional clusters (firm and year), according to the methods proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) and Thompson (2011).The results obtained in this study support this latter view, suggesting that there is a negative relationship between the multidimensionality of product-market competition and the practices of manipulation of results. In addition, when analyzing EM specifically for real activities, the data suggested that firms in more competitive environments tend to manage results through manipulation of production or discretionary expenditures. Another relevant finding of this research is that different dimensions of the product-market competition presented different behaviors (opposite signs) in the same econometric model. The presence of this behavior suggests that the competition should not be captured unidimensional, since other characteristics of the competition (dimensions) may present opposite behaviors.