Sobre o estatuto discursivo do Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein: aspecto autoexplicativo

• Ano de defesa: 2023
• Autor(a) principal: Cerqueira, Erivaldo Soares
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo; BR; Mestrado em Filosofia; Centro de Ciências Humanas e Naturais; UFES; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: Contrassenso; Proposições; Discurso; Aspecto autoexplicativo; Filosofia
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/12324

This dissertation deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and emphasizes the problem of final self-refutation manifested in aphorism 6.54. In this aphorism, Wittgenstein stresses that anyone who understands it must recognize the Tractatian propositions as absurd and abandon them in the end. The consequent self-refutation of the work proves to be part of the process of elucidating the propositions of the Tractatus. This dissertation, therefore, aims to clarify the dynamics involved in this enlightening process and, therefore, justify in what sense a work, supposedly composed of nonsense, can be enlightening. Therefore, in the first chapter, a re-reading of the work Tractatus is carried out in order to understand its main concepts and discuss the apparently incongruous aspect of its discourse. In the second chapter, taking into account the theme of self-refutation, the debate between two interpretative currents of the Tractatus is analyzed: the Standard Reading and the Revisionist Reading. Following the proposal of this dissertation, the emphasis will be on the ineffable reading of Peter Hacker and the resolute readings of Cora Diamond and James Conant. According to inefabilists, although the propositions of the Tractatus are absurd, they convey certain ineffable insights into the nature of reality, thought, and the world. To justify this interpretation, the ineffabilists resort to the distinction between “saying” and “showing”. On the other hand, resolute interpreters believe that in the Tractatus nothing is said or shown; they are simply nonsense that must be abandoned, as suggested by Wittgenstein himself. The resolute see the Tractatus as a kind of therapy whose aim is to cure the reader of the illusions arising from the misuse of language. Based on this debate, in the last chapter, from a third line of interpretation, alternative to the ineffable and resolute readings, a certain peculiarity of the Tractatian discourse will be emphasized, which demonstrates to reveal a “self-explanatory aspect” to the Tractatus. Understanding this aspect can contribute to understanding the elucidative dynamics of the Tractatus and, thus, recognizing that the supposed paradox of final self-refutation is only apparent.