A relação metafísica entre matéria e mal na filosofia de Plotino

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2021
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Robert Brenner Barreto da
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Tese
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Mal
Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/59994
Resumo: The aim of this research is to analyze the metaphysical relationship between matter and evil in Plotinus' Enneads. The conjunction of these concepts is established by the philosopher by identity. Such a formulation is controversial, because all reality is grounded in the One/Good (hén agathón), whereas, if matter belongs to the emanation ruled by Good, and matter is evil, the problem of a possible conception of evil as derivative of the Good arises. Texts such as What evils are and where they come from I.8 [51], On Matter II.4 [12] and others of a similar argumentative nature provide the prima facie understanding that Plotinus admits the matter as an principle of explanation for the evil. In addition to this fundamental problem, in excerpts from the aforementioned treatises there is a clear reference to matter as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the constitution of the sensible cosmos. If matter has this ontocosmological role, is this consideration coherent with that initial notion of matter as linked to evil? The matter is a problem worthy of study also as it motivates other important controversies among Plotinus scholars. Among these questions there are two main ones: whether matter would be generated or not and whether it would be absolute evil. These two major problems are associated with the need to choose between two interpretive assumptions: that of dualism, which establishes matter as an independent principle of the One; and that of monism, which tries to integrate matter into the whole of the procession that comes from the One as a single principle. As will be discussed throughout the work, whether by one way or another, the explanation of the matter will need to be consistent with the whole of Plotinus' philosophy. Otherwise, the Plotinian construction should be evaluated as fragile, at least under this aspect of his metaphysics. The success of this examination of the matter-evil binomial depends on two levels of comprehension: what is obtained from the texts in loco and the more coherent interpretation of them as a whole. To achieve this goal, it will be proposed to read treatises V.2[11], I.6 [1], I.8 [51]. II.4[12], II.5[25], III.6[26], III.9[13], IV.8[6] and II.9[33] of Plotinus. The order of analysis follows a thematic-exhibitory character; as well as the main references of interpretation on the subject, from which Schäfer (2004) and Opsomer (2007) stand out. These two levels are reflected in two methodological parameters: a) exegetical and b) philosophical. First, the interpretation of what the philosopher's texts say must be pursued; second, whether the philosophical content internal to the development of these texts leads to a consistent inference. In a word, if the Plotinian conclusion follows from its own metaphysical premises.