A crítica lógica do direito romano por Hegel

• Ano de defesa: 2021
• Autor(a) principal: Tibúrcio, Mateus Germano Moreira Frota
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; História; Dialética; Direito Romano; History; Dialectics; Roman Law
• Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/60619

This work speaks about the criticism launched by the german philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) against the Roman Law in the work entitled Fundamental Lines of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts). First of all, it’s established that the dimension of the problem is more theoretical than practical, namely, it’s in an essentially logical dimension. Against the ideas of jurists like Gustav Hugo (1764- 1844) and Friedrich Carl Von Savigny (1779-1861), which represented the so-called Historical School (historische Schule), the philosopher from Stuttgart harshly criticizes the idea by which the Roman Law would be an example of demonstration or logical rigour. Rather the opposite, the Roman Law is notorious for its logical vices which created serious problems, namely vices related to abstraction, largely caused by the interference of conveniences which would deform the legal meaning, largely of economic nature. If it’s the case, history wouldn’t be able to justify the law in any case at all, which seems to be Hegel’s opinion; this would difficult the possibility of rationalizing the Law in a purely historical perspective, as it’s the case in many rationalists both early and late. The implications brought by this opinion seem to push the conventional interpretation by which Hegel would be a rationalist away. Roman Law would be the historical form of the Abstract Law, and its greater vice would be the alienation of liberty