Superando o trancendentalismo epistomológico: A postura universal da filosofia sistemático-estrutural de L. B. Puntel

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2019
Autor(a) principal: Lopes, Marden Moura
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/41463
Resumo: The paradigm of epistemological overturning in Western philosophy has been lost, which has been articulated in a more rigorous way, subverting, above all in Kant’s philosophy, the theory that identifies being and thinking and inserting a radical dichotomy between the dimension of the subject and the dimension of the world . Although different forms of deconstruction of tradition have been articulated within the framework of contemporary philosophy, their fundamental postures nevertheless remain linked to the caesura between subject and world of modern philosophy. This means that a theory of the dimension of the world conceived, in the words of the philosopher of Königsberg, as a thing-in-itself presents itself to us as an impossible task. The general objective of this dissertation is, in opposition to this conception, to present as Puntel an inversion of the Copernican revolution operated by the philosophy of Kant and inherited by several variants of contemporary philosophy. The difficulty encountered by our task comes very strictly from the fact that it prevailed exclusively in the course of Kant’s long philosophical tradition, that is, the conception that the cognoscent subject and the world are two opposing dimensions - sometimes called of epistemic categories – always separated by an insurmountable gap. The scope and delimitation of this position is markedly marked by the idea that it is we who project our conceptual schemas to the world, so that the world itself is neither exposed nor reached. The idea of Kant, taken to the last consequences, collapses the thesis that identifies being and thinking, which sometimes regulated the philosophical activity. This work presents as Puntel, in opposition to transcendentalism and all its nuances, defends a conception that exposes the necessity of the world to possess intrinsically an expressively ontological structure, that is, a structure that is not projected on him by any transcendental subject, such as the conscious and unconscious partisans of the Kantian heritage maintain, as is the case with Habermas. As we shall see, Puntel sustains the thesis that the world as a whole and with all its things is expressible; expressiveness is presented to us here as an immanent structural moment of the world (of the universe), being consequently coextensive with it. The feasibility and intelligibility of Puntel’s theoretical positioning takes place within the idea that in philosophy we must give language a central role. However, misunderstanding of this thesis may lead to ambiguities regarding Puntel’s interests. The language of which Puntel speaks is not a language as a production of subjects, but a universal ontological structure that strikes the world itself. An adequate language such as Puntel’s aim is an irreplaceable component of every theory and every theoretical discourse, because a theory or a theoretical discourse must be articulated linguistically. It is for this reason that the language articulated by the Systematic-Structural Philosophy (FSE) is understood as fundamentally connected to the world considered in itself. The ESF develops the concept of a philosophical language from the most important foundation of the systematic conception that is no more than the concept of theoretical reference framework: the theoretical frame of reference developed for systematic-structural philosophy should not be understood as the one and the absolute, but as the theoretical framework that pretends to be the best possible at present. Through this the program delineated by the FES has as an obligation to dissuade the postures that tend to theorize from a transcendental theoretical framework and, therefore, to a great extent, Puntel tries to rethink how it is possible to rearticulate the thesis between ‘to be and to think’ within the structural scope which proposes, invoking a dimension that connects the dimensions separated by the radical abyss: between the dimension of the world and the dimension of the subject. This work is effective in recognizing the place from which the subject theorizes and this is only feasible insofar as this same subject is de-motivated. An astonishing characteristic of this decrease power is that instead of losing its epistemological reach, the subject increases that capacity.