Estruturas de governança no setor têxtil : um estudo das relações entre empresas de confecção e fornecedores

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2015
Autor(a) principal: Fabbro, Jacqueline Ruelis
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Estadual de Maringá
Brasil
Departamento de Administração
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração
UEM
Maringá, PR
Centro de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://repositorio.uem.br:8080/jspui/handle/1/3272
Resumo: The marketing and institutional changes have impacted the Brazilian textile sector resulting in a new competitive environment and new organizational forms. Thus, the present study sought to understand the relationship inside the textile sector, specifically in the garment bond. This study aimed to reveal how the governance structures, between garment companies in Paraná and its suppliers, may promote the coordination and the guarantee of property rights among agents. Therefore, it was used as a theoretical basis the New Institutional Economics, considering the complementarity presented in the Transaction Cost Economics and the Measurement Cost Economics. The theoretical framework allowed an investigation conducted by the attributes of transactions and measurable dimensions from those. In this sense, a qualitative study was conducted; it considered secondary and primary data. Secondary data were obtained from specialized materials, reports, and documents. In addition to these data, there were primary data collection, carried out in a field research through semi-structured interviews with two garment companies belonging to the state of Parana, working in the swimwear segment and jeans segment. From the indication of the main inputs of each garment company, there were selected the most relevant suppliers. The suppliers were contacted so that there were also semi-structured interviews with such agents. In that sense, four suppliers of swimwear clothing and five suppliers of jeans clothing were interviewed, bringing forth a total of eleven interviews for this study. From the content obtained by these interviews, it was used the method of content analysis considering the following categories: governance structure, the transaction attributes and the measurable dimensions. It was identified that the suppliers are selected by the companies according to reputation, resulting on the recurrence of transactions on the speed necessary to meet market demands. This recurrence influenced the trust between the interviewed, which was identified as a key factor in the relationship between such agents. In this sense, trust proved to be essential to the execution of transactions, standing out from other devices (technical specification sheet and purchase orders). The transactions were identified by exclusive inputs and not exclusive inputs therefore the unique inputs showed specificity of assets (physical specificity, temporal and dedicated assets) and non-exclusive inputs have primarily functional characteristics. The measurable dimensions are subject to measurement, but are not measured in its entirety. The characteristics of each input are listed in a technical specification sheet that guides the "guarantee" agreed between the agents, along with purchase orders and invoices. However, measurements are made partly because of the reputation and trust among agents. The relationship occurred is then a hybrid governance structure type, through verbal agreements and formal request for purchase orders based on product characteristics as well as from the measurable dimensions. It is concluded that the economic right has greater representation when compared to the legal right, and there is low formality in the execution of transactions. In this sense, this practice can lead to coordination failures, because property rights are partially guaranteed.