Ensaios sobre pol??ticas p??blicas e incentivos no mercado de trabalho brasileiro

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Tillmann, Gustavo Alves
• Orientador(a): Maldonado, Wilfredo Fernando Leiva
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Cat??lica de Bras??lia
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa Strictu Sensu em Economia de Empresas
• Departamento: Escola de Gest??o e Neg??cios
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Trabalho; Desemprego; Seguro-desemprego; Sal??rio
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: ECONOMIA
• Resumo em Inglês: This work comprises two studies on labor economics. The first uses a dynamic programming model to define the steady state equilibrium between workers, firms and government, in an economy where a matching function defines hiring and salaries are the result from a bargaining process. With the introduction of policy changes the effects on wages, investment in professional training and unemployment rate are compared with the original equilibrium of the economy. The results indicate that changes towards higher production - especially productivity shocks - have proved more effective to increase jobs and wages, but generates a disincentive to workers invest to raise skill level. The second study examines the cyclical behavior of benefit policies for unemployed in Brazil and the possibility of misalignment of incentives in Brazilian labor legislation. It is used a survey to see if and how the willingness to participate in a dismissal agreement modifies with changes in benefits and perceived risk of punishment levels. Statistically, the findings only suggest that there may be a reaction to the perception of access to a greater or lesser benefit value, but they are statistically significant to the perception of punishment, indicating that an increase in supervision seems to be the measure that provides the immediate results to policy alignment.
• Link de acesso: https://bdtd.ucb.br:8443/jspui/handle/tede/2370

This work comprises two studies on labor economics. The first uses a dynamic programming model to define the steady state equilibrium between workers, firms and government, in an economy where a matching function defines hiring and salaries are the result from a bargaining process. With the introduction of policy changes the effects on wages, investment in professional training and unemployment rate are compared with the original equilibrium of the economy. The results indicate that changes towards higher production - especially productivity shocks - have proved more effective to increase jobs and wages, but generates a disincentive to workers invest to raise skill level. The second study examines the cyclical behavior of benefit policies for unemployed in Brazil and the possibility of misalignment of incentives in Brazilian labor legislation. It is used a survey to see if and how the willingness to participate in a dismissal agreement modifies with changes in benefits and perceived risk of punishment levels. Statistically, the findings only suggest that there may be a reaction to the perception of access to a greater or lesser benefit value, but they are statistically significant to the perception of punishment, indicating that an increase in supervision seems to be the measure that provides the immediate results to policy alignment.