Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2015 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Queiroz, Andr?? Zancanaro
 |
| Orientador(a): |
Aguiar, Julio Cesar de
|
| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Cat??lica de Bras??lia
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa Strictu Sensu em Direito
|
| Departamento: |
Escola de Humanidade e Direito
|
| País: |
Brasil
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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| Resumo em Inglês: |
The present work aims to describe the reasons to institute distinctly unconstitutional laws to increase taxes under an interdisciplinary perspective. The choice of Behaviorist Analisys of Law and, subsidiary, microeconomics perspectives was made because the traditional method of the Science of Law has limitations, searching to elaborate interpretations of the Law and conclude the validity of rules and lawfulness of legal facts, without explaining the reasons of effectiveness of rules or to disobey the law. It is assumed that the investigated phenomenon is a behavior practiced by political authorities, liable to a behaviorist investigation, which occurs in response to motivations under a context, being selected by contingencies. Politics may be comprehended as a market, regulated by rules presented in the Constitution, enforced by the Judiciary. Politicians need, as main objective, to obtain votes to be elected to elective offices. The increase of governmental expenses allows the adoption of popular rules and public policies. Otherwise, the increase of taxes is unpopular. To the legislators, more susceptible of electoral pressure, was designated the function to elevate taxes. The Executive branch has to logroll with parliamentarians to approve laws that increase taxes and enable the increase of public expenses. The increase of taxes by unconstitutional rules occurs when the cost of logrolling to approve a law that follows the Constitution is higher than the political costs and the cost to bear the sanctions to the illicit investigated behavior |
| Link de acesso: |
https://bdtd.ucb.br:8443/jspui/handle/tede/1957
|
Resumo: |
The present work aims to describe the reasons to institute distinctly unconstitutional laws to increase taxes under an interdisciplinary perspective. The choice of Behaviorist Analisys of Law and, subsidiary, microeconomics perspectives was made because the traditional method of the Science of Law has limitations, searching to elaborate interpretations of the Law and conclude the validity of rules and lawfulness of legal facts, without explaining the reasons of effectiveness of rules or to disobey the law. It is assumed that the investigated phenomenon is a behavior practiced by political authorities, liable to a behaviorist investigation, which occurs in response to motivations under a context, being selected by contingencies. Politics may be comprehended as a market, regulated by rules presented in the Constitution, enforced by the Judiciary. Politicians need, as main objective, to obtain votes to be elected to elective offices. The increase of governmental expenses allows the adoption of popular rules and public policies. Otherwise, the increase of taxes is unpopular. To the legislators, more susceptible of electoral pressure, was designated the function to elevate taxes. The Executive branch has to logroll with parliamentarians to approve laws that increase taxes and enable the increase of public expenses. The increase of taxes by unconstitutional rules occurs when the cost of logrolling to approve a law that follows the Constitution is higher than the political costs and the cost to bear the sanctions to the illicit investigated behavior |
