Temporalidade e constituição : uma investigação acerca do acesso metodológico à esfera da consciência constitutiva do tempo na fenomenologia husserliana

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2015
Autor(a) principal: Thomé, Scheila Cristiane
Orientador(a): Ferraz Neto, Bento Prado de Almeida lattes
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Tese
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de São Carlos
Câmpus São Carlos
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia - PPGFil
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7599
Resumo: The aim of this work is to analyze the possibility and the apparent limit of the reflective-descriptive methodological access to the deepest layer of the constitution of time in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. If on one side, reflection presents a real possibility of the phenomenological description of consciousness by seeing and capturing in an objectifying way the acts and objects of consciousness, on the other hand, there seems to be at first glance a certain limit concerning the grasp of reflection because reflection can not capture the deepest sphere of the constitution of time as it picks up objects and acts of consciousness, so this original constituent sphere can never become an object. The price paid for making this ultimate constitutive sphere of time an object is falling into a return to infinity. The examination of this methodological issue will be conducted based on the analysis of three periods in which Husserl investigates this question, namely, in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917); Bernau Manuscripts (1917-1918) and Manuscripts C (1929 to 1934). The thesis that is being defended here is that ever since his early writings about the theme of temporality, Husserl seeks to prepare an answer to the question concerning the methodological access to the deepest realm of time constitution; but it is particularly in his afterthought by formulating the notion of transzendentalphänomenologisierende Ich that Husserl dissolves once and for all the apparent "limit" or "puzzle" about the reflective-descriptive access to the ultimate sphere of time constitution. This resolution becomes possible because the phänomenologisierende Ich is here understood as the Ego which constitutes the time as well as the Ego that observes itself retrospectively in their ways of constituting, so that in this retrospective and constituent movement the transcendental life of consciousness is accessed and can then be captured descriptively in their deepest constituents layers.